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Falling Dollar? 
Many financial observers have argued that 
when (or if) the economy weakens this year, 
real GNP will fall, and thereby lead to lower 
money demand and interest rates. These 
developments, they argue, will then put 
downward pressure on the dollar in foreign-
exchange markets. But will a weakening 
economy necessari Iy lead to a weaker dollar? 
For a number of reasons, the results should 
be otherwise. 
The crucial pointto remember is the nature of 
the initial disturbance which is generally 
expected to affect the 1980 economy. The 
expectation is for a cyclical decline (or 
deceleration) in the nation's aggregate 
demand. This disturbance would then 
generate all the other effects-on income, 
money demand, and interest rates. On this 
basis, we could well conclude that the 
cyclical decline in demand will in fact 
strengthen the dollar. 
Exchange rates, and a weakening economy 
A year or two ago, many analysts argued that 
the dollar was weak because the U.S. 
economy was strong, with real GNP rising 
faster in this country than abroad. The idea 
was that the cyclical upturn was stimulating 
imports and so weakening the trade deficit, 
and also pushing up prices-in both cases 
weakening the dollar. Yet some of  these same 
commentators are arguing now  thatthe dollar 
wi  II weaken as the economy weakens-
ignoring the now beneficial effects on trade 
and prices, and instead concentrating on the 
supposed effects of lower interest rates. The 
two positions are clearly inconsistent. 
With respect to the earlier (1978) situation, 
empirical evidence supports the view that 
upward cyclical movements in income had 
generated a downward movement in dollar 
exchange rates. Therefore, today, the reverse 
would be expected: downward cyclical 
movements should lead to an improvement 
in prices and in the balance of  payments, and 
so to an improvement in the outlook for the 
dollar. 
The argument fQr a weaker dollar tends to 
confuse (in economists' jargon) a movement 
along a money-demand schedule with an 
enormous shift in that schedule. True enough, 
in the latter case, when economic actors 
suddenly decide to hold fewer dollars than 
previously at any given level of  prices, 
interest rates, and exchange rates,the dollar 
should weaken. But that is not  th~ situation 
that we are currently discussing. Rather, in 
the present case, the initial disturbance is in 
the goods markets, and falling income and 
falling interest rates will then have offsetting 
effects on the quantity of money demanded. 
The initial disturbance should cause prices, 
incomes, and interest rates to change to 
maintain equilibrium in all markets, but 
without an autonomous decline in money 
demand, there need be no weakening in 
dollar exchange rates. 
Some might argue that the dollar should 
weaken as foreign investors reduce their 
demand for dollar assets, because of  the 
decline in U.S. interest rates associated with a 
weakening economy. But in net terms, 
demand for U.5. assets need not be any lower 
than before, because U.S. investors are likely 
to make up for the decline in foreign demand. 
In other words, the market should be willing 
to hold the same or a larger amount of  assets 
at lower interest rates because domestic 
purchasers, when reducing their demand for 
goods during an economic slowdown, are 
likely to increase their demand for assets at 
the same time. That is, foreign investors are 
not getting out  of  dollars because of  a decline 
in confidence for dollar assets, but rather 
because aggressive buying by U.S. investors 
is pushing down interest rates and bidding 
them out of  the market. Again, in that event, 
there need be no decline in the value of  the 
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Endogenous variables 
The argument linking falling interest and 
exchange rates also seems specious because 
it posits a close relationship between two 
variables, interest rates and exchange rates, 
both of  which are in fact endogenous. The 
argument suggests that interest rates 
determine exchange rates. Yet in reality, both 
variables respond to disturbances or shocks 
to underlying economic parameters. Some 
types of shocks wi  II cause them to move in 
opposite directions. Thus, knowing only how 
interest rates are changing need not tell us 
anything about how exchange rates are 
changing. 
For example, as argued above, a shock to 
aggregate goods demand will cause interest 
and exchange rates to move in opposite 
directions. Similarly, a decline in inflation 
expectations in the U.S. would lower U.S. 
interest rates and strengthen dollar exchange 
rates: again moving them in opposite 
directions. However, changes in money 
supply or money demand would-in the 
short-run, at least-move interest and 
exchange rates in the same direction. The 
analysts linking falling exchange rates to 
cyclically declining interest rates have 
apparently confused the resu Its from 
money-demand or money supply shifts with 
the phenomena of aggregate demand sh ifts 
such as we have already discussed. 
Monetary-control perspective 
Even if  there were some theoretical basis for 
linking falling interest rates and falling 
exchange rates, there is no practical reason 
for deliberately keeping interest rates high (by 
slowing money growth), as a means of 
calming exchange markets and strengthening 
the dollar. Indeed, such a step could be 
counterproductive, by leading market 
participants to question the direction of 
Federal Reserve policy, which since last 
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October 6 has focused directly on 
bank-reserve growth rather than on the 
Federal-funds rate. Market participants might 
decide that if  the monetary authorities try to 
hold interest rates up on the downside of  the 
business cycle, they will also likely  try to hold 
interest rates down on the upside of  the cycle. 
Such a perception would increase long-run 
inflation expectations, and thus reduce 
long-run confidence in the dollar. 
To understand this argument, recall that we 
have emphasized that no automomous 
decline in money demand is likely to occur 
during the cyclical decline this year. 
However, eve  I} if  one were to occur, the issue 
wou  Id then sh'ift to whether the Fed shou Id 
drop its money supply targets and hold 
interest rates up in response to such a 
disturbance. Now for years, economists have 
argued over whether the Fed shou Id target 
monetary aggregates or interest rates in 
response to shocks to the economy. The 
argument for concentrating on the 
aggregates, which is implicit in the Fed's 
October 6 policy shift, centers around the 
poi  nt that the Fed wou  Id be forced to make 
constant changes in the money supply if it 
attempted to iron out every shock to interest 
rates. Such a process would destabilize the 
money supply, and in extreme cases could 
lead to explosive inflationary or deflationary 
episodes. By endeavoring to control the 
money supply instead, the Fed permits the 
market to determine interest rates and  , 
allocate credit. Short-run interest fluctuations 
may be more erratic, but over the long-run, 
interest rates (and exchange rates) wi  II be' 
more stable, simply because periods of 
severe inflation or recession will be avoided 
through better control of  the money supply. 
Thus, the Fed may improve short-run stability 
if it were to hold interest rates steady in the 
face of  every alleged shift in money demand, but it would do so at the almost certain 
expense of greater long-run instability in the 
economy. The argument is not that further 
tightening now would be bad in and of itself, 
but that it wou  Id engender expectations of 
continued erratic (and perhaps explosive) 
money growth in the future. Therefore, 
expectations of future money growth and 
inflation could undo any beneficial effects 
obtained from further tightening of policy in 
the present situation. 
In sum, our analysis suggests that there are 
both theoretical and practical reasons for 
Alternate Strategies Toward Inflation 
doubting that falling interest rates at home 
will weaken the position of  the dollar abroad, 
and/or that policy should tighten further to 
keep rates high. This popular argument can 
be criticized on theoretical grounds for 
involving several basic fallacies, which 
misinterpret the nature of money demand 
and mistakenly link the movements of 
interest rates and exchange rates. Finally, in 
practical terms, it appears questionable 
because it wou  Id suggest that the Fed shou Id 
reverse a pol  icy  decision made on the basis of 
long and thoughtful study. 
Michael Bazdarich 
The Fall 1979 issue of  the Economic Review contains four articles discussing various aspects of 
inflation. The articles are titled: 
* The Phenomenon of Inflation, and the Prospects for Anti-Inflation Policy 
* Conducting Effective Monetary Policy:The Role of  Operating Instruments 
* Optimal Control and Money Targets: Should the Fed Look at "Everything"? 
* Exchange-Rate Policies and Inflation: Theory and Evidence 
For free copies of  this and other Federal Reserve publications, write or phone the Public 
Information Section, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, P.O. Box 7702, San Francisco, 
California 94120. Phone (415) 544-2184. 
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BANKING DATA-TWElFrH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT 
~  (Dollar amounts in millions) 
Selected Assets and liabilities 
large Commercial Banks 
Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments* 
Loans (gross, adjusted) - total# 
Commercial and industrial 
Real estate 
Loans to individuals 
Securities loans 
U.s. Treasury securities* 
Other securities* 
Demand deposits - total# 
Demand deposits - adjusted 
Savings deposits - total 
Time deposits - total# 
Individuals, part. & corp. 
(Large negotiable CD's) 
Weekly Averages 
of Daily Figures 
M8nber Bank Reserve Position 
Excess Reserves (+  )/Deficiency (-) 
Borrowings 
Net free reserves (+  )/Net borrowed( -) 
Federal Funds - Seven Large Banks 
Net interbank transactions 
[Purchases (+  )/Sales (-)] 
Net, U.s. Securities dealer transactions 
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Change from 
yearago@ 
Dollar  Percent 
17,210  +  14.30 
16,620  +  16.90 
4,196  +  14.60 
8,588  +  24.30 
4,479  +  22.30 
242  - 13.40 
527  6.90 
1,117  +  7.70 
3,704  +  8.70 
2,205  +  7.00 
1,686  - 5.60 
8,020  +  15.70 
8,811  +  21.30 
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* Excludes trading account securities. 
#  Includes items not shown separately. 
@ Historical data are not strictly comparable due to changes in the reporting panel; however, adjustments 
have been applied to 1978 data to remove as much as possible the effects of the changes in coverage. In 
addition, for some items, historical data are not available due to definitional changes. 
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